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Abstract—We study transportation networks controlled by
dynamic feedback congestion tolls. We focus on a multiscale
model whereby the dynamics of the traffic flows are intertwined
with those of the routing choices. The latter are influenced
by the current congestion through the network as well as
by decentralized congestion-dependent tolls controlled by the
system planner. We prove that a class of decentralized monotone
congestion-dependent tolls allow for globally stabilising the trans-
portation network around a generalized Wardrop equilibrium. In
particular, our results imply that using decentralized marginal
cost tolls, stability of the dynamic transportation network is
guaranteed to be around the social optimum traffic assignment.
This is particularly remarkable as such feedback tolls can
be computed in a fully local way without the need for any
global information about the network structure, its state, or the
exogenous network loads. Through numerical simulations, we
also compare the performance of such decentralized dynamic
feedback tolls with constant off-line (and centrally) optimized
tolls both in the asymptotic and in the transient regime and we
investigate their robustness to information delays.
Index Terms—Transportation networks, distributed control,
user equilibrium, congestion pricing, dynamical flow networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past years there has been an increasing interest in
the control analysis and synthesis of dynamical transportation
networks. Such interest is especially motivated by the wide-
spreading sensing, communication, information, and actuation
technologies that are dramatically changing the transportation
system dynamics and affecting the users’ decision making
and behaviors. There is a growing awareness that the new
opportunities and risks created by these technologies can be
fully understood within a dynamical network framework.
Dynamics and control of traffic flows over networks have
received a great deal of research attention, motivated by
applications both to communication networks [1]–[5] and
to road transportation systems [7]–[11]. Special emphasis in
this literature has been put on mathematical structures of
the problem (e.g., convexity, monotonicity, contractivity) that
allow for scalable control architectures (e.g., distributed or
decentralized controls) [13]–[16].
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A central aspect of dynamical flow networks is the routing,
that in classical approaches is taken as static (see, e.g., the Cell
Transmission Model [17]), possibly determined by a network
flow optimization problem such as a system or user optimum
traffic assignment problem ([18], [19]). On the other hand, the
impact of dynamic routing on the stability and resilience of
traffic flow networks has been recently analized [20]–[23].
In particular, within road traffic networks, there has been
also a significant research effort to understand the drivers’
answer to external communications from intelligent traveller
information devices [24]–[25]. A traffic recommender which
can announce potentially misleading travel time information
and a new class of latency functions so as to influence the
drivers’ behaviour was studied in [26] and [27], respectively.
Moreover, it is known that if individual drivers make their own
routing decisions to minimize their own experienced delays,
overall network congestion can be considerably higher than
if a central planner had the ability to explicitly direct traffic.
Charging tolls or providing signalling schemes subjected to a
non-trivial amount of uncertainty are, therefore, two potential
strategies to influence drivers to make routing choices that
result in globally optimal routing (see [28]–[36]).
In this paper, we study multiscale dynamical flow networks
whereby the physical dynamics of the traffic flows are inter-
twined with those of the routing choices. In particular, we
extend the model and results of [23] by introducing decen-
tralized congestion-dependent tolls in order to influence the
route choice behaviour. Specifically, we consider a multiscale
dynamical model of the transportation network whereby the
traffic dynamics describing the real time evolution of the local
congestion level are coupled with those of the path preferences.
We assume that the latter evolve following a perturbed best
response to global information about the congestion status of
the whole network and to decentralized flow-dependent tolls.
Our main result shows that by using non-decreasing de-
centralized flow-dependent tolls and in the limit of a small
update rate of the aggregate path preferences, the transportation
network globally stabilises around the Wardrop equilibrium
[37]. The latter is a configuration in which the perceived
cost associated to any source-destination path chosen by a
nonzero fraction of users does not exceed the perceived cost
associated to any other path. As in [23], we assume that the
path preferences evolve at a slower time scale than the physical
traffic flows and adopt a singular perturbation approach [38]
to the stability analysis of the ensuing multiscale closed-loop
traffic dynamics. Note that classic results of evolutionary game
theory and population dynamics [39]–[40] cannot be applied to
our framework since they suppose that the access to information
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2take place at a single temporal and spatial scale and that
the traffic dynamics are neglected by assuming that they are
instantaneously equilibrated.
The introduction of tolls has long been studied as a way to
influence the rational and selfish behaviour of users so that
the associated Wardrop equilibrium can align with the system
optimum network flow. A well-studied taxation mechanism that
guarantees this alignment is marginal-cost pricing (see, e.g.,
[41] and [42]). Marginal-cost tolls do not require any global
information about the network structure, user demands or state
and can be computed in a fully local way. Using marginal-cost
tolls we prove that our transportation network stabilizes around
the social optimum traffic assignment. It is worth observing
that our results go well beyond the traditional setting [41]
where only static frameworks are considered as well as [42]
where only path preference dynamics are consider, neglecting
the physical ones that are assumed equilibrated. In fact, our
analysis is carried over in a fully dynamical flow network
setting. In this respect, the global optimality guarantees that
are obtained in this paper through decentralized feedback toll
policies should be compared with other recent results on global
performance and resilience of the robust distributed control of
dynamical flow networks [21], [12].
In the last part of the paper through numerical simulations
we compare the performance both asymptotic and the one
during the transient of the system by using distributed marginal
cost tolls and constant marginal cost ones. The latter, know
in the literature as “fixed” tolls (being the tolling function
on each edge a constant function of edge flow) have been
well studied, and it is known that they can be computed
to enforce the social optimum equilibrium provided that the
system planner has a complete knowledge of the network
topology, user demand profile and delay functions. We show
that not only is more convenient take into account the marginal
cost tolls at convergence speed level but also they are strongly
robust to variation of network topology, user demand and traffic
rate. At the end we insert a time-delay in the global information
of the slow scale dynamics and show how that influences the
evolution of the multi-scale dynamical system. For different
values of the previous delay, one observes a different behaviour
of the system depending on whether you use the marginal cost
tolls instead of the constant marginal cost ones. With the latter,
the system remains stable and converges to the equilibrium,
instead with the former a phase transition and an oscillatory
behaviour emerge as the delay increases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the model and observe the influence of distributed
dynamics tolls on the network dynamics. In Section III we
state the main results of the paper which proofs are showed
in section IV. In Section VI we provide a numerical study of
the different time and asymptotic convergences of the system.
Section VII draws conclusions and suggests future works.
A. Notation
LetA and B be finite sets. Then |A| denotes the cardinality of
A, RA the space of real-valued vectors whose components are
indexed by elements of A, and RA×B the space of real-valued
matrices whose entries are indexed by pairs in A × B. The
transpose of a matrix Q ∈ RA×B is denoted by Q′ ∈ RB×A,
I is an identity matrix and 1 an all one vector whose size
depends on the context. For, i ∈ A, δ(i) ∈ RA denotes the
vector with all entries equal to 0 excepte for the i-th that is
equal to 1. We use the notation Φ := I − |A|−111′ ∈ RA×A
to denote the projection matrix of the space orthogonal to
1. The simplex of a probability vector over A is denoted by
S(A) = {x ∈ RA+ : 1′x = 1}. Let ‖ · ‖p be the class of
p-norms for p ∈ [1,∞], and by default, let ‖ · ‖ := ‖ · ‖2. Let
now sgn : R → {−1, 0, 1} be the sign function, defined by
sgn(x) = 1 if x > 0, sgn(x) = −1 if x < 0 and sgn(x) = 0 if
x = 0. By convention, we will assume the identity d|x|/dx =
sgn(x) to be valid for every x ∈ R, including x = 0. Finally,
given the gradient ∇f of a function f : D → R with D ⊆ RA,
we denote with ∇˜f = Φ∇f the projected gradient on S(A).
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. Transportation network
We model the topology of the transportation network as a
directed multi-graph G = (V, E), where V is a finite set of
nodes and E is a finite set of directed links. Each link i in E is
directed from its tail node θi to its head node κi 6= θi. We shall
allow for parallel links, i.e., links i 6= j such that θi = θj and
κi = κj , hence the prefix in multi-graphs. On the other hand,
we shall assume that there are no self-loops, i.e., that θi 6= κi
for every i in E . We shall denote by B ∈ {−1, 0, 1}V×E the
node-link incidence matrix of G, whose entries are given by
Bvi =

+1 if v = θi
−1 if v = κi
0 if v 6= θi, κi.
A length-l path from a node v0 to a node vl is a string of
links γ = (i1, i2, . . . , il) such that the tail node of the first
link is θi1 = v0, the head node of the last link is κil = vl, the
tail node of the next link coincides with the head node of the
previous link, i.e., vs = κis = θis+1 for 1 ≤ s ≤ l − 1, and
no node is visited twice, i.e., vr 6= vs for all 0 ≤ r < s ≤ l,
except possibly for v0 = vl, in which case the path is referred
to a cycle. A node d is said to be reachable from another node
o if there exists at least a path from o to d. Observe that, in
contrast to [23] where the transportation network was assumed
to be cycle-free, in this paper we allow for the presence of
cycles.
Throughout the paper, we will consider a given origin node o
and a destination node d 6= o that is reachable from o and let Γ
be the set of paths from o to d of any length l ≥ 1. Denote the
corresponding link-path incidence matrix by A ∈ {0, 1}E×Γ
with entries
Aiγ =
{
1 if i ∈ γ,
0 if i /∈ γ.
We shall refer to nonnegative vectors y ∈ RE+ generally as flow
vectors. A flow vector y such that
By = λ
(
δ(o) − δ(d)
)
, (1)
3for some λ ≥ 0 will be referred to as an o-d equilibrium flow
vector of throughput λ, and δ(o) and δ(d) are the nominal
source and destination flows of the single origin-destination
networks considered in the paper. For λ ≥ 0, let us consider
the simplex
Sλ =
{
z ∈ RΓ+ : 1′z = λ
}
. (2)
Observe that, for z ∈ Sλ, one has BAz = λ(δ(o)−δ(d)), hence
yz = Az (3)
is an o-d equilibrium flow vector of throughput λ. Throughout,
we shall refer to any z ∈ Sλ as a path preference vector and to
yz defined as in (3) as the associated equilibrium flow vector.
Each link i of the transportation network topology G
represents a cell. We shall denote the traffic volume in and the
outflow from cell i ∈ E by xi and yi, respectively. We shall
assume that traffic volume and outflow of each cell are related
by a functional dependence
yi = ϕi(xi), i ∈ E , (4)
satisfying the following property.
Assumption 1. For every link i ∈ E the flow function
ϕi : R+ → R+ is twice continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing, strictly concave, and such that
ϕi(0) = 0, ϕ
′
i(0) <∞ .
For every link i in E , let
Ci := sup{ϕi(xi) : xi ≥ 0}
be its maximum flow capacity.
Remark 1. Note that in road traffic networks the assumption
that the flow functions are strictly increasing remains valid
provided that we confine ourselves to the free-flow region, as is
done in [23]. Please see Section V for a discussion of how the
framework of this paper could possibly be extended to more
accurate dynamical models for road traffic flow networks, such
as the Cell Transmission Model [17].
Denote by τi : R+ → [0,+∞],
τi(yi) :=

+∞ if yi ≥ Ci
ϕ−1i (yi)/yi if 0 < yi < Ci
1/ϕ′i(0) if yi = 0 ,
(5)
the cell’s latency function, returning the delay incurred when
traversing link i ∈ E , when the current flow out of it is yi. The
following simple but useful result is proven in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Let ϕi : R+ → R+ be a flow function satisfying
Assumption 1. Then, the corresponding latency function τi
defined in (5) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing on the interval [0, Ci), and such that τi(0) > 0.
Moreover, its first derivative is given by
τ ′i(y) =
y − xϕ′i(x)
ϕ′i(x)y2
, x = ϕ−1i (y) , (6)
and the function y 7→ yτi(y) is strictly convex on [0, Ci).
o
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Figure 1. Example of network with cycle.
Let us now define the set of feasible flow vectors as
F = {y ∈ RE+ : yi < Ci , i ∈ E}
and the set of feasible path preferences as
Z := {z ∈ Sλ : yz ∈ F}.
Moreover, let the total latency associated to a flow vector
y ∈ RE+ be
L(y) =
∑
i∈E
yiτi(yi) . (7)
Observe that the total latency L(y) is finite if and only if the
flow vector y is feasible. In fact, as a consequence of Lemma
1, we have that the total latency function L(y) is a strictly
convex function of y ∈ F . Notice that, by the max-flow min-
cut theorem (see [18], Thm. 4.1), the set of feasible flows F
contains equilibrium o-d flows if and only if the throughput
λ < Cmin cuto,d , where
Cmin cuto,d = minU⊆V :
o∈U, d/∈U
∑
i∈E :
θi∈U, κi /∈U
Ci
is the min-cut capacity. It then follows that, for every λ ∈
[0, Cmin cuto,d ), the total latency L(y) admits a unique minimizer
y∗(λ) in the set of feasible equilibrium o-d flows of throughput
λ. We shall refer to such unique minimizer
y∗(λ) := argmin
y∈RE+
By=λ(δ(o)−δ(d))
L(y) (8)
as the social optimum equilibrium flow.
Example 1. Consider the network in Figure 1 with node
set V = {o, a, b, d} and link set E = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6}.
It contains four distinct paths from o to d. In fact, we
may write Γ = {γ(1), γ(2), γ(3), γ(4)}, where γ(1) = (i1, i5),
γ(2) = (i2, i6), γ(3) = (i1, i3, i6), and γ(4) = (i2, i4, i5). Note
that there is a cycle γ(o) = (i3, i4). For each link i ∈ E , let
the flow functions be given by
ϕi(xi) = Ci(1− e−xi) , i ∈ E , (9)
where Ci > 0 is link i’s capacity. Then, the corresponding
latency functions are given by
τi(yi) =

+∞ if yi ≥ Ci,
1
yi
log
(
Ci
Ci − yi
)
if yi ∈ (0, Ci),
1/Ci if yi = 0.
(10)
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Figure 2. Plots of the flow function (9) in (a) and of the latency function
(10) in (b), in the special case of capacity Ci = 1.
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Figure 3. In (a), plot of the minimum total latency as a function of the
throughput λ for a transportation network with topology as in Figure 1, flow
functions as in (9), and link capacities as in 11. In (b), plots of the corresponding
social optimum flow vector y∗(λ). In particular y∗6(λ) is overlapped to y
∗
1(λ),
while y∗5(λ) is overlapped to y
∗
2(λ).
Plots of the flow function (9) and of the latency function (10)
are reported in Figure 2. In the special case when the link
capacities are
Ci1 = 3 , Ci2 = 1 , Ci3 = 1 , Ci4 = 1 , Ci5 = 1 , Ci6 = 3 ,
(11)
the min-cut capacity is Cmin cuto,d = 3 and the minimum total
latency and corresponding social optimum flow are plotted in
Figure 3 as a function of the throughput λ ∈ [0, Cmin cuto,d ).
B. Multi-scale model of network traffic flow dynamics
We shall consider a physical traffic flow entering the network
from the origin node o at a constant unit rate, traveling through
it on the different paths and finally exiting the network from
the destination node d. Conservation of mass implies that the
traffic volume on link i at time t evolves as
x˙i(t) = λδ
(o)
θi
+
∑
j∈E
Rji(t)yj(t)− yi(t) , (12)
where
yi(t) = ϕi(xi(t)) (13)
is the total outflow from link i, the term Rij(t) stands for the
fraction of outflow from link i that moves directly towards
link j, and the term λδ(o)θi accounts for the constant exogenous
inflow in the origin node o. Topological constraints and mass
conservation imply that Rij(t) = 0 whenever κi 6= θj , i.e.,
whenever link j is not immediately downstream of link i, and
that
∑
j∈E Rij(t) = 1 for every i ∈ E such that θi 6= d. The
matrix R(t) = (Rij(t))i,j∈E will be referred to as the routing
matrix.
Throughout, we shall assume that the routing matrix is
determined by the path preferences that are continuously
updated in response to available congestion information and
dynamic tolls. Formally, the relative appeal of the different
paths is modelled by a time-varying nonnegative vector z(t)
in the simplex Sλ, to be referred to as the current aggregate
path preference.1 We shall assume that such aggregate path
preferences determine the routing matrix as
Rij(t) =
{
Gj(z(t)) if θj = κi
0 if θj 6= κi , (14)
for i, j ∈ E and t ≥ 0, where G : Z → RE+ is given by
Gj(z) =

yzj∑
i∈E:θi=θj
yzi
if
∑
i∈E:θi=θj
yzi > 0
1
|{i ∈ E : θi = θj}| if
∑
i∈E:θi=θj
yzi = 0 ,
(15)
for each cell j in E and it is continuously differentiable.
Equations (14) and (15) state that at every junction, represented
by a node v in V , the outflow from every incoming cell i
such that κi = v gets split among the cells j immediately
downstream (i.e., such that θj = v) according to the proportion
associated to the equilibrium flow vector yz corresponding to
the path preference z, provided that yz is such there is flow
passing through node v, and otherwise the split is uniform
among the immediately downstream cells.
In the considered dynamical network traffic model, the
aggregate path preference vector z(t) is continuously updated
as route decision makers access global information about the
current congestion status of the whole network embodied by
the vector
l(t) = (li(t))i∈E , li(t) = τi(yi(t)) , (16)
of current latencies on the different links. The aggregate
path preference vector is also influenced by a vector w(t) =
(wi(t))i∈E of dynamic tolls, that are to be determined by
the transportation system operator. Specifically, let the cost
perceived by each user, crossing a link i ∈ E , be given by the
sum of the latency li(t) and the toll wi(t) so that the perceived
total cost that a expected to incur on a path γ ∈ Γ assuming
that the congestion levels on that path won’t change during the
journey is
∑
iAiγ(li(t) + wi(t)). We shall then assume that
the path preferences are updated at some rate η > 0, according
to a noisy best response dynamics
z˙(t) = η(F (β)(l(t), w(t))− z(t)), (17)
where for every fixed uncertainty parameter β > 0 the function
F (β) : RE+ × RE+ → Z is the perturbed best response defined
as follows:
F (β)(l, w) =
λ exp(−β(A′(l + w)))
1′ exp(−β(A′(l + w))) . (18)
1Recall that Sλ stands for the simplex over the set of o-d-paths Γ, as
defined in (2).
5We shall rewrite the coupled dynamics of the physical flow
and the path preferences defined in (12)–(18) in the compact
notation{
x˙(t) = H(y(t), z(t)) , y(t) = ϕ(x(t)) ,
z˙(t) = η
(
F (β) (l(t), w(t))− z(t)) , (19)
where H : F × Z → RE is defined as
Hi(y, z) := Gi(z)
(
λδ
(o)
θi
+
∑
j:κj=θi
yj
)
−yi , i ∈ E . (20)
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MAIN RESULTS
The goal of this paper is to design robust scalable feedback
pricing policies
ω : F → RE+ (21)
determining in real time the dynamic tolls
w(t) = ω(y(t)) (22)
with the objectives of guaranteeing stability and achieving
social optimality for the closed-loop network traffic flow
dynamics (19)—(22).
Observe that, for any given fixed inflow λδ(o) and constant
tolls w, stability and convergence to the corresponding Wardrop
equilibrium —as defined later in this section— follow from
the results in [23]. In fact, given full knowledge of the
exogenous inflow λδ(o) and of the whole transportation network
characteristics, one could use classical results in order to pre-
compute static tolls that would align such Wardrop equilibrium
with the social optimum. However, such an approach would
result in an inadequate solution as it would lack robustness
with respect to the value of the exogenous input λδ(o), as well
as to changes of the network characteristics in response, e.g.,
to accidents and other disruptions.
In contrast, we seek to design feedback pricing policies that
are universal with respect to values of the exogenous inflow
and robustly adapt in real time to changes of the network
characteristics. We shall particularly focus on the class of
decentralized monotone feedback pricing policies, as defined
below.
Definition 1. In a transportation network with topology G =
(V, E), a feedback pricing policy ω : F → RE+ is said to be:
(i) monotone if ω(y) ≥ ω(y′) for every y, y′ ∈ F such
that y ≥ y′, where inequalities are meant to hold true
entrywise;
(ii) decentralized if, for every i ∈ E , the toll wi = ωi(y) is
a function of the flow yi on link i only.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we shall emphasize the
local structure of decentralized pricing policies by writing
wi = ωi(yi), with a slight abuse of notation. As shown in the
following, such robust fully local feedback pricing policies can
be designed with global guarantees on stability and optimality.
Before stating our main results, we introduce the notion of
generalized Wardrop equilibrium with feedback pricing.
Definition 2. (Generalized Wardrop equilibrium with feedback
pricing). For a transportation network with topology G = (V, E)
and latency functions τi, let o and d in V , with d 6= o reachable
from o, be an origin and a destination, respectively. Let Γ the
set of o-d paths and A the link-path incidence matrix. Then,
for a feedback pricing policy ω : F → RE+, an o-d equilibrium
flow vector y ∈ F of throughput λ is a generalized Wardrop
equilibrium if y = Az for some path preference vector z ∈ Sλ
such that for all γ ∈ Γ such that zγ > 0, we have
(A′ (τ(y) + ω(y)))γ ≤ (A′ (τ(y) + ω(y)))γ˜ ∀γ˜ ∈ Γ. (23)
Equation (23) states that the sum of the total delay and
the total toll associated to an o-d path γ at the equilibrium
flow y are less than or equal to the sum of the total delay
and the total toll associated to any other o-d path γ˜. Hence,
a generalized Wardrop equilibrium with feedback pricing is
characterized as being the flow associated to a path preference
vector supported on the subset of paths with minimal sum of
total latency plus total toll. In the special case with no tolls,
i.e., when the feedback pricing policy ω(y) ≡ 0, this reduces
to the classical notion of Wardrop equilibrium [37]. More in
general, for constant tolls ω(y) ≡ w we get the standard notion
of Wardrop equilibrium with tolls. For general decentralized
monotone feedback pricing policies, existence and uniqueness
of a generalized Wardrop equilibrium are guaranteed by the
following result proven in Appendix B.
Proposition 1. Consider a transportation network with topol-
ogy G = (V, E) and strictly increasing latency functions. Let
o and d in V , with d 6= o reachable from o, be an origin
and a destination, respectively. Then, for every throughput
λ ∈ [0, Cmin cuto,d ) and every decentralized monotone feedback
pricing policy ω : F → RE+, there exists a unique generalized
Wardrop equilibrium y(ω) and it can be characterized as the
solution of the convex optimization problem
y(ω) = arg min
y∈RE+
By=λ(δ(o)−δ(d))
∑
i∈E
Di(yi) , (24)
where, for each link i ∈ E ,
Di(yi) =
∫ yi
0
(τi(s) + ωi(s)) ds (25)
is the primitive of the perceived cost τi(yi) + ωi(yi).
Note that in (25) it’s possible to weigh τi differently from ωi
just rescaling them through two different constants α¯, ξ¯ ∈ R+,
α¯ 6= ξ¯.
In the following, we shall prove that for small η and large β,
the long-time behaviour of the system (19) is approximately at
Wardrop equilibrium which, under proper distributed feedback
pricing policies, coincides with the social optimum equilibrium.
The following is the main result of the paper. It will be proved
in the next section using a singular perturbation approach.
Theorem 1. Consider a transportation network with topology
G = (V, E) and flow functions satisfying Assumption 1. Let
λ ∈ [0, Cmin cuto,d ) be the throughput and ω : F → RE+ be a
Lipschitz-continuous monotone decentralized feedback pricing
policy. Then, there exists a perturbed equilibrium flow y(ω,β) ∈
F such that, for every initial condition (z(0), x(0)) ∈ Z×RE+,
6Figure 4. Block diagram of the problem.
the solution of the closed-loop network traffic flow dynamics
(19)—(22) satisfies
lim sup
t→∞
‖y(t)− y(ω,β)‖ ≤ δ¯(η) , η > 0 , (26)
where δ¯(η) is a nonnegative-real-valued, nondecreasing func-
tion such that limη→0 δ¯(η) = 0. Moreover,
lim
β→∞
y(ω,β) = y(ω). (27)
Theorem 1 states that the system planner globally stabilises
the transportation network around the Wardrop equilibrium
using non-decreasing decentralised congestion-dependent tolls.
Remark 2. Note that Theorem 1 does not follow from Theorem
2.5 in [23]. Indeed, although the functions τ and ω both depend
on the flow y, it is not always possible consider an auxiliary
function τ¯ = τ +ω and directly apply the result from [23] due
to the specific structure imposed on τ in (5) and to verification
of the Lemma 1. The only two cases where the application of
the result in [23] is possible are when ω is null or it is constant.
In both cases, indeed, the corresponding function τ¯ is defined
similarly to (5) and satisfies Lemma 1. The feedback structure
of the considered closed-loop multiscale transportation network
dynamics is illustrated in Figure 4.
Now, we focus on the special case of decentralized feedback
tolls the marginal cost tolls, namely,
wi(t) = ωi(yi(t)) = yi(t)τ
′
i(yi(t)) , i ∈ E . (28)
Due the properties of the delay function τi, the above tolls (28)
are increasing, then the Theorem 1 continue to hold. Moreover
the following holds
Corollary 1. Consider (28) as the decentralized congestion-
dependent tolls that influence the system (19). Then the latter
globally stabilises the transportation network around the social
optimum traffic assignment y∗(λ), i.e., one has
lim
β→∞
y(ω,β) = y∗(λ), (29)
for every λ > 0 and this is possible without knowing arrival
rates or the network structure.
Proof. First notice that with feedback marginal cost tolls
ωi(yi) = yiτ
′
i(yi), the perceived cost τi(yi) + ωi(yi) on each
link i ∈ E has primitive
Di(yi) =
∫ yi
0
(
τi(s) + sτ
′
i(s)
)
ds = yiτi(yi) ,
so that ∑
i∈E
Di(yi) = L(y)
coincides with the total latency. It then follows from the
characterization (24) of Proposition 1 that
y(ω) = arg min
y∈RE+
By=λ(δ(o)−δ(d))
∑
i∈E
Di(yi) = arg min
y∈RE+
By=λ(δ(o)−δ(d))
L(y) = y∗(λ) .
The claim then follows as a direct application of Theorem
1.
Remark 3. It can be easily seen that Corollary 1 holds true
also if the dynamic feedback marginal cost tolls (28) are
replaced by the constant marginal cost tolls
w∗i = y
∗
i (λ)τ
′
i(y
∗
i (λ)) , i ∈ E . (30)
However, in contrast to the dynamic feedback marginal cost
tolls (28), such constant marginal cost tolls (30) require
knowledge both of the social optimum flow and the exogenous
inflow λδ(o) and lack robustness with respect to changes of
the value of λδ(o), as well as to changes of the network.
Remark 4. In order to implement the dynamic feedback
marginal cost tolls (28), each local controller is required to
compute the product yiτ ′i(yi) of the link’s current flow times
the link’s latency function’s derivative. Notice that, using (5),
we get
ωi(yi) =
1
ϕ′i(xi)
− xi
yi
,
Hence, it is possible to carry the problem of the knowledge of
τ ′i to the computation of the derivative of the flow function ϕi.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we prove Theorem 1. First of all, notice that
since the functions F (β), G, and ϕ are differentiable, standard
results imply the existence and uniqueness of a solution of the
initial value problem associated to (19). In order to prove the
stability result, we shall adopt a singular perturbation approach.
Our strategy consists in thinking of the path preference vector
z as quasi-static when we analyse the fast-scale dynamics (12),
and considering the flow vector y almost equilibrated (i.e.,
close to yz) when study the slow-scale dynamics (17). Then
we will give a series of intermediate results that will turn out
to be useful to complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Before proceeding, we introduce some notation to be used
throughout the section. Similar to (16) and (22) let
lz(t) = (lzi (t))i∈E , l
z
i (t) = τi(y
z
i (t))
and
wz(t) = (wzi (t))i∈E , w
z
i (t) = ωi(y
z
i (t))
be respectively, the vector of current latencies and the one of
dynamic tolls both corresponding to the flow yz associated to
the path preference z.
Furthermore, observe that the perturbed best response
function (18) satisfies
F (β)(l, w) := arg min
α∈Zh
{α′A′(l + w) + h(α)}, (31)
7where h : Z → R is the negative entropy function defined as
h(z) = β−1
∑
γ∈Γ
zγ log zγ , (32)
using the standard convention that 0 log 0 = 0. In fact, all our
analysis and results apply to a more general setting where the
perturbed best response function is defined as
F (h)(l, w) := arg min
α∈Zh
{α′A′(l + w) + h(α)}, (33)
for some admissible perturbation h : Zh → R such that
Zh ⊆ Z is a closed convex set, h(·) is strictly convex, twice
differentiable in int(Zh), and limz→∂Zh‖∇˜h(z)‖ =∞. These
conditions on h imply that Fh(l, w) ∈ int(Zh) and that it is
continuously differentiable on RE+ × RE+. Notice that clearly
the negative entropy function (32) is an admissible perturbation
as defined above. We shall then proceed to proving Theorem
1 in this more general setting.
Now, let
xzi := ϕ
−1
i (y
z
i ), σi := sgn(xi − xzi ) = sgn(yi − yzi )
denote, respectively, the volume corresponding to the flow
associated to the path preference z and the sign of the difference
between it and the actual volume xi. Then, we define the
functions
V (y, z) = ‖y − yz‖1, and W (x, z) = ‖x− xz‖1. (34)
The technical Lemmas aim at showing that (34) are Lyapunov
functions for the fast-scale dynamics (12) with stationary path
preference z.
Lemma 2. Let E ⊆ E be a nonempty set of cells. Then,
max
j∈E
(
1−
∑
i∈E
θi=κj
Gi(z)
)
≥ 1|V| (35)
Proof. Let V = {v ∈ V : v = κi, i ∈ E}. Observe that∑
i∈E
θi=d
Gi(z) = 0 ,
so that, if d ∈ V then
max
j∈E
(
1−
∑
i∈E
θi=κj
Gi(z)
)
= 1 ,
and the claim follows immediately.
We can then focus on the case when d /∈ V . Let
α =
∑
i:κi∈V
θi /∈V
yzi + λδ
(o)
i (36)
be the total inflow in V which is also equal to the total outflow
from V . Indeed α in (36) can be also written as
α =
∑
i:κi /∈V
θi∈V
yzi =
∑
v∈V
∑
i:κi /∈V
θi=v
yzi ≤
∑
v∈V
∑
i/∈E
θi=v
yzi (37)
Now, let fv =
∑
i:κi=v
yzi be outflow from a single node v and
observe that fv ≤ α for every node v. Using this and (37) we
get
α ≤
∑
v∈V
∑
i/∈E
θi=v
yzi =
∑
v∈V
fv
∑
i/∈E
θi=v
Gi(z) ≤ α
∑
v∈V
∑
i/∈E
θi=v
Gi(z).
(38)
Hence,
1
|V| ≤
1
|V| ≤
1
|V|
∑
v∈V
∑
i/∈E
θi=v
Gi(z) ≤ max
v∈V
∑
i/∈E
θi=v
Gi(z) , (39)
so that
max
j∈E
(
1−
∑
i∈E
θi=κj
Gi(z)
)
= max
v∈V
∑
i/∈E
θi=v
Gi(z) ≥ 1|V| ,
hence proving the claim.
Lemma 3. For every y = ϕ(x) ∈ F and z ∈ Z
∇xW (x, z)′H(y, z) ≤ −ςV (y, z),
where ς = 1/|V||E|.
Proof. Observe that by (15) we get
yzi = Gi(z)
(
λδ
(o)
θi
+
∑
j:κj=θi
yzj
)
.
We will use the above in the second equality of the computation
below. Indeed we have
∇xW (x, z)′H(y, z) =∑
i∈E
σi
(
Gi(z)
(
λδ
(o)
θi
+
∑
j:κj=θi
yj
)
− yi
)
=
∑
i∈E
σi
(
Gi(z)
(
λδ
(o)
θi
+
∑
j:κj=θi
yj
)
−Gi(z)
(
λδ
(o)
θi
+
∑
j:κj=θi
yzj
))
+
∑
i∈E
σi(y
z
i − yi)
=
∑
i∈E
σi
(
Gi(z)
∑
j:κj=θi
(yj − yzj )
)
−
∑
i∈E
σi(yi − yzi ).
(40)
Now, define
E = {i ∈ E : σi 6= 0}
and put
δi = |yi − yzi | , i ∈ E .
We have that
δi ≥ min
k∈E
δk ≥ ‖δ‖1|E| , ∀ i ∈ E .
8Then by (40)∑
i∈E
σi
(
Gi(z)
∑
j:κj=θi
(yj − yzj )
)
−
∑
i∈E
σi(yi − yzi )
≤
∑
i∈E
(
Gi(z)
∑
j∈E:κj=θi
δj
)
−
∑
i∈E
δi
= −
∑
j∈E
δj
(
1−
∑
i∈E:θi=κj
Gi(z)
)
≤ −‖δ‖1|E| maxj∈E
(
1−
∑
i∈E:θi=κj
Gi(z)
)
≤ − ||δ||1|V||E| = −ςV (y, z)
(41)
by using Lemma 2
The following two results show that both yzi (t) and yi(t)
stay bounded away from the maximum flow capacity Ci.
Lemma 4. Given the admissible perturbation (32), there exists
t0 ∈ R+ and, for every link i ∈ E , a finite positive constant
Ci, dependent on h, but not on η, such that for every initial
condition (z(0), x(0)) ∈ Z × [0,+∞)E ,
yzi (t) ≤ Ci < Ci ∀t ≥ t0, ∀i ∈ E .
Proof. The fact that yzi (t) ≤ λ for all i ∈ E follows from the
fact that the arrival rate at the origin is unitary. Hence, for
all i ∈ E with Ci > λ (and therefore also for Ci = ∞) the
claim follow with Ci = λ and t0 = 0. We now consider the
case when Ci < λ for all i ∈ E . Recall that by the definition
of admissible perturbation, the domain of (32) is a closed set
Zβ ⊆ int(Z). This implies that
ξi := Ci − sup{(Aα)i : α ∈ Zβ} > 0.
It follows from (18) that
Ci − ξi = sup{(Aα)i : α ∈ Zβ} ≥ sup{(AF (β)(l, w))i}.
Hence, one gets
d
dt
yzi (t) = η(A(F
(β)(l(t), w(t))− z(t)))i ≤ η(Ci − ξi − yzi ).
This implies that
yzi (t)−Ci+ξi ≤ (yzi (0)−Ci+ξi)e−ηt ≤ λe−ηt, t ≥ 0, (42)
where the last inequality comes from the fact that yzi (0) ≤ λ
and Ci ≥ ξi. The lemma for i ∈ E with Ci < λ now follows
from (42) by choosing, for example, Ci := Ci−ξ/2 with ξ :=
min{ξi : i ∈ E s.t. Ci < λ} and t0 := −η−1 log(ξ/2λ).
Lemma 5. Given the admissible perturbation (32), there exists
η∗ > 0 and a finite positive constant C˜i for every i ∈ E ,
dependent on h, but not on η, such that for every η < η∗ and
every initial condition (z(0), x(0)) ∈ Z × [0,+∞)E ,
yi(t) ≤ C˜i < Ci ∀t ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ E .
Proof. For t ≥ 0, let us define
ζ(t) := W (x(t), z(t)), χ(t) := V (y(t), z(t)),
where V and W are defined in (34). By the Lemma 4 there
exists t0 ≥ 0 and a positive constant Ci for every i ∈ E , such
that for every t ≥ t0 and applying the inverse of the function
ϕi we get
xzi (t) ≤ x∗i , x∗i := ϕ−1i (Ci) ∀i ∈ E . (43)
Since xzi (t) ≥ 0, (43) implies that if |xi(t) − xzi (t)| ≥ 2x∗i
for some t ≥ t0, then xi(t) ≥ 2x∗i for t ≥ t0. Hence yi(t)−
yzi (t) ≥ χ∗i for all t ≥ t0, where χ∗i = ϕi(2x∗i ) − Ci. Being
ϕi strictly increasing, then one has
χ∗i = ϕi(2x
∗
i )− Ci > ϕi(x∗i )− Ci = 0.
Now, let
ζ∗ := 2|E|max{x∗i : i ∈ E}, χ∗ := min{χ∗i : i ∈ E}.
and observe that
W (x, z) ≤ |E|max{|xi − xzi | : i ∈ E},
V (y, z) ≥ |yi − yzi | ∀i ∈ E .
Therefore, it follows that for any t ≥ t0, if ζ(t) ≥ ζ∗, then for
some i′ ∈ E we have that |xi′(t) − xzi′(t)| ≥ 2x∗i′ for t ≥ t0.
This in turn involves that χ(t) ≥ χ∗i′ ≥ χ∗. Hence,
ζ(t) ≥ ζ∗ =⇒ χ(t) ≥ χ∗ > 0 ∀t ≥ t0. (44)
Moreover by (43) follows that there exist some µ > 0 such
that ∑
i∈E
1
ϕ′i(x
z
i (t))
≤ µ ∀t ≥ t0.
By combining the above with Lemma 3 one finds that for any
u, t ≥ t0,
ζ(t)− ζ(u) =
∫ t
u
∑
i∈E
σi
(
d
ds
xi − d
ds
xzi
)
ds
≤
∫ t
u
∇xW (x, z)′H(y, z)ds
+
∫ t
u
∑
i∈E
η
ϕ′i(x
z
i (t))
|(AF (β)(lz, wz))i − (Az)i|ds
≤
∫ t
u
(
− ς χ(s) + 2ληµ
)
ds.
(45)
Now, by contradiction, let us assume that lim supt→∞ yi(t) ≥
Ci for some i ∈ E . Since yi(t) = ϕi(xi(t)) < Ci for every
t ≥ 0 then lim supt→∞ xi(t) = ∞. From this follows that
the lim supt→∞ ζ(t) = ∞. Then, in particular, the set T :=
{t > 0 : ζ(t) > ζ(s) ∀ s < t} is an unbounded union of open
intervals with limt∈T ,t→∞ ζ(t) =∞. This and (44) imply that
there exist a nonnegative constant t∗ ≥ t0 such that
χ(t) ≥ χ∗ ∀t ∈ T ∩ [t∗,∞). (46)
Now defining η∗ := ς χ∗/2λµ, for every η < η∗, (45) and
(46) give
ζ(t)− ζ(u) ≤
∫ t
u
(
− ς χ(s) + 2ληµ
)
ds
≤
∫ t
u
(
− ς χ∗ + 2ληµ
)
ds < 0
9for any t > u ≥ t∗ such that t and u belong to the same
connected component of T . But this contradicts the definition
of the set T . Hence, if η < η∗ then lim supt→∞ yi(t) < Ci for
any i ∈ E . Since on every compact time interval I ⊆ R+, one
has supt∈I yi(t) = yi(tˆ) < Ci for some tˆ ∈ I, the previous
implies the claim.
Lemma 6. There exists K > 0 and t1 ≥ 0 such that for every
initial condition (z(0), x(0)) ∈ Z×[0,+∞)E , ‖∇˜zh(z(t))‖ ≤
K for all t ≥ t1.
Proof. By the Lemma 5, there exist T ∗, υ∗ > 0 such that
‖l(t)‖ ≤ T ∗ and ‖w(t)‖ ≤ υ∗ for all t ≥ 0. This fact
together with the definition of F (β)(l, w) (18) imply that
F (β)(l(t), w(t)) ∈ int(Zβ) and ∇˜zh(F (β)(l(t), w(t))) =
−ΦA′(l(t) + w(t)). Hence ‖∇˜zh(F (β)(l(t), w(t)))‖ ≤
‖Φ‖‖A′‖S∗, with S∗ = T ∗+υ∗. This implies the existence of
a convex compact K ⊂ int(Zβ) such that F (β)(l(t), w(t)) ∈ K
for all t ≥ 0. Define
∆(t) :=
η
1− e−ηt
∫ t
0
e−η(t−s)F (β)(l(s), w(s)) ds.
Since ∆(t) is an average of elements of the convex set K, then
∆(t) ∈ K ∀t ≥ 0. Moreover, z(t) = e−ηtz(0)+(1−e−ηt)∆(t)
approaches K, which implies that for large enough t, z(t) ∈ K1,
where K1 is a closed subset of int(Zβ) that contains K. Hence,
after large enough t, say, t1, ∇˜zh(z(t)) stays bounded.
Lemma 7. There exist ` > 0 and t0 ≥ 0 such that for every
initial condition (z(0), x(0)) ∈ Z × [0,+∞)E ,
∇˜zW (x(t), z(t))′(F (β)(l(t), w(t))−z(t)) ≤ 2λ`|E| ∀t ≥ t0.
Proof. Observe that thanks to Lemma 4 there exist t0 ≥ 0
such that `i := sup{1/ϕ′i(xzi (t)) : t ≥ t0} < +∞. Put ` :=
max{`i : i ∈ E}. Then, for every path γ ∈ Γ and for every
t ≥ t0, one has∣∣∣∣∂W (x, z)∂zγ
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣−∑
i∈E
σi
∂
∂zγ
xzi
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈E
σi
∂
∂zγ
ϕ−1i
(∑
γ
Aiγzγ
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
i∈E
Aiγ
1
ϕ′i(x
z
i )
≤
∑
i∈E
Aiγ`i ≤ `|E|.
Therefore,
2λ`|E| ≥
∑
γ
F (β)γ (l, w)
∣∣∣∣∂W (x, z)∂zγ
∣∣∣∣+∑
γ
zγ
∣∣∣∣∂W (x, z)∂zγ
∣∣∣∣
≥
∑
γ
F (β)γ (l, w)
∂W (x, z)
∂zγ
−
∑
γ
zγ
∂W (x, z)
∂zγ
= ∇˜zW (x, z)′(F (β)(l, w)− z).
We now combine Lemmas 3 and 7 in order to estimate the
behaviour in time of W (x(t), z(t)).
Lemma 8. There exist `, L, η∗ > 0 and t0 ≥ 0 such that for
every initial condition z(0) ∈ Z , x(0) ∈ [0,+∞)E ,
W (x(t), z(t)) ≤
2λ`Lη|E|
ς
+ e−ς(t−t0)/L
(
W (x(t0), z(t0))− 2λ`Lη|E|
ς
)
for t ≥ t0 and η < η∗.
Proof. Define ζ(t) := W (x(t), z(t)). Note that thanks to
Lemmas 4 and 5, there exist L > 0, η∗ > 0 and t0 ≥ 0
such that for any η < η∗,
|xi(t)− xzi (t)| ≤ L|yi(t)− yzi (t)| ∀i ∈ E , t ≥ t0.
This involves that
V (y(t), z(t)) ≥ 1
L
W (x(t), z(t)) =
1
L
ζ(t) ∀η < η∗, t ≥ t0.
Moreover W (x, z) is a Lipschitz function of x and z, while
both x(t) and z(t) are Lipschitz on every compact time interval.
Therefore ζ(t) is Lipschitz on every compact time interval and
hence absolutely continuous. Thus dζ(t)/dt exists for almost
every t ≥ 0, and, thanks to Lemmas 3 and 7 it satisfies
dζ(t)
dt
=
dW (x(t), z(t))
dt
= ∇xW (x, z)′H(y, z) + η∇˜zW (x, z)′(F (β)(l, w)− z)
≤ −ςV (y, z) + 2λ`η|E| ≤ − ς ζ(t)
L
+ 2λ`η|E|.
Then, integrating both sides we get the claim.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Now we are able to prove Theorem 1. Let us consider the
function
Θ : Z → R+, Θ(z) :=
∑
i∈E
∫ yzi
0
(
τi(s) + ωi(s)
)
ds (47)
and observe that
∇˜Θ(z) = ΦA′(lz + wz) ∀z ∈ int(Z). (48)
Note that since τi(yi) +ωi(yi) is strictly increasing, then each
term of
∫ yzi
0
(
τi(yi) + ωi(yi)
)
dyi is convex in yzi . Hence, the
composition with the linear map z 7→ yzi =
∑
γ Aiγzγ is
convex in z, which in turn implies convexity of Θ over Z .
Then using the perturbation (32) we obtain the strict convexity
of Θ(z) + h(z) on Zβ . Moreover, being Zβ a compact and
convex set, there exists a unique minimizer
zβ := arg min{Θ(z) + h(z) : z ∈ Zβ}. (49)
Let now y(ω,β) := yz
β
. Then the following hold.
Lemma 9. The perturbed equilibrium flow y(ω,β) ∈ F is such
that
lim
β→∞
y(ω,β) = y(w).
Proof. Since {Azβ} ⊆ AZ , and AZ is compact, there exists
a converging subsequence {Azβk : k ∈ N}. Let us denote by
yˆ := limk Az
βk ∈ AZ its limit and choose some zˆ ∈ Z such
that yˆ = Azˆ.
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Notice that since sup{τi(yzi ) + ωi(yzi ) : z ∈ Zβ} < +∞ for
all i ∈ E , the differentiability of h in int(Zβ) implies that
the minimizer in (49) has to be in the interior of Zβ . As a
consequence, one finds that necessarily
∇˜zh(zβk) = −ΦA′(τ(Azβk) + ω(Azβk)),
which successively implies that F βk(τ(Azβk), ω(Azβk)) =
zβk . Then, using the general definition of perturbed best
response (33), one finds that
(Azβk)′(τ(Azβk) + ω(Azβk)) + hβk(z
βk)
≤(Azβk)′(τ(Azβk) + ω(Azβk)) + hβk(α),
(50)
for all α ∈ Zβk . Now, fix any z ∈ Z . Since Zβ → Z 2 then
there exists a sequence {z˜k} such that z˜k ∈ Zβk for all k and
limk z˜
k = z. Hence, taking α = z˜k in (50) and passing to the
limit as k grows large, one finds that
zˆ′A′(τ(yˆ) + ω(yˆ)) ≤ z′A′(τ(yˆ) + ω(yˆ)) ∀ z ∈ Z.
In turn, the above can be easily shown to be equivalent to
the condition (23) characterizing Wardrop equilibria. From the
uniqueness of the Wardrop equilibrium, it follows that neces-
sarily yˆ = y(w). Then the claim follows from the arbitrariness
of the accumulation point yˆ, hence y(ω,β) → y(w).
We now estimate the time derivative of Θ(z) + h(z) along
trajectories of our dynamical system. Hence define
Ψ(t) := Θ(z(t)) + h(z(t)),
ψ(t) := ΦA′(lz(t) + wz(t)) + ∇˜zh(z(t)).
Then, using (48), we get
Ψ˙(t) =
(
∇˜zΘ + ∇˜h(z)
)
z˙ = ηψ(t)′(F (β)(l(t), w(t))− z(t))
= ηψ(t)′(F (β)(lz(t), wz(t))− z(t))
+ ηψ(t)′(F (β)(l(t), w(t))− F (β)(lz(t), wz(t))).
(51)
By Lemma 8 there exist t2 ≥ 0, η∗ > 0 and M1 > 0 such
that for any η < η∗, W (x(t), z(t)) ≤ ηM1 for all t ≥ t2. By
the definition of W follows that W (x, z) ≥ ‖x − xz‖1/|E|
for all x, z. Moreover, by the properties of ϕ, follows that
‖y − yz‖1 ≤ L‖x− xz‖1 for all y, z, and L := max{ϕ′i(0) :
i ∈ E}. Combining all these relationships we get that there
exists a M > 0 such that for every η < η∗,
‖y(t)− yz(t)‖ ≤ ηM ∀t ≥ t2, (52)
where M = |E|M1L. Thanks to the differentiability of F (β)
on RE+ ×RE+ and the boundedness of both yz(t) and y(t) one
gets
‖F (β)(l(t), w(t))− F (β)(lz(t), wz(t))‖ ≤ K1η
for some positive constant K1, η < η∗ and t large enough.
Since by Lemmas 4 and 6 follows that lz(t), wz(t)) and
∇˜zh(z(t)) are eventually bounded, then there exists a positive
constant K2 such that ‖ψ(t)‖ ≤ K2 for t large enough. This
2The convergence limβ Zβ = Z holds with respect to the Hausdorff metric
and Z is the closure of Z .
implies that the second addend in the last line of (51) can be
bounded as
ηψ(t)′(F (β)(l(t), w(t))− F (β)(lz(t), wz(t))) ≤ Kη2 (53)
∀η < η∗, ∀t ≥ t3 where K = K1K2 and for some sufficiently
large but finite value of t3. Now, observe that for every z ∈ Z
ΦA′(lz(t) + wz(t))) = −∇˜zh(F (β)(lz(t), wz(t)))
so that the first addend in the last line of (51) may be rewritten
as
ψ(t)′(F (β)(lz(t), wz(t))− z(t)) = −Υ(z(t)), (54)
where
Υ(z(t)) =
(
∇˜zh(F (β)(lz(t), wz(t)))− ∇˜zh(z(t))
)′
· (F (β)(lz(t), wz(t))− z(t)).
It follows from (51), (53), and (54) that for η < η∗ and t ≥ t3,
Ψ˙(t) ≤ −ηΥ(z(t)) +Kη2. (55)
From the strict convexity of h(z) on Zβ , Υ(z(t)) ≥ 0 for
every z, with equality if and only if z = zβ . Now, put
δ¯(r) ={
sup{‖yz − y(ω,β)‖ : Υ(z) ≤ Kr}+Kr if 0 ≤ r < η∗,
C˜
√|E| if r ≥ η∗,
where C˜ := max{1, C˜i : i ∈ E}, with C˜i as defined in Lemma
5. It can be proved that δ¯(r) is nondecreasing, right-continuous,
and such that limη→0 δ¯(η) = δ¯(0) = 0. Then, (52) and (55)
imply that for η < η∗,
lim sup
t→∞
‖y(t)− y(ω,β)‖ ≤ δ¯(η). (56)
Note that since y(t) ∈ [0, C˜]E and y(ω,β) ∈ AZ ⊆ [0, 1]E then
|yi(t) − y(β)i | ≤ max{C˜i, 1} ≤ C˜ for all i ∈ E and hence
‖y(t) − y(ω,β)‖2 ≤ |E|C˜2. Then (56) also holds for η ≥ η∗,
since in that range δ¯(r) = C˜
√|E|. This together with Lemma
9 conclude the proof.
V. POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS OF THE RESULTS
As discussed, the framework and results presented in the
previous sections have arguably two major limitations: the
assumption that there is a single origin/destination pair and the
assumption that the link flow functions are strictly increasing.
In this section we briefly discuss possible extensions of our
results that include relaxations of these two assumptions.
First, it is possible to extend our results to the case of
multiple origin-destination pairs as follows. Let {(ok, dk)}k∈K
be a set of origin-destination pairs where ok 6= dk ∈ V for
each k ∈ K. Let λ ∈ RK+ be a vector of associated throughputs
ν =
∑
k∈K
λk
(
δ(θok ) − δ(κdk )
)
, ν+ = [ν] ν− = [ν]− .
Let Γk be the set of (ok, dk)-paths and A(k) ∈ {0, 1}E×Γk
the link-path incidence matrix. Let Γ = ∪k∈KΓk and A ∈
{0, 1}E×Γ be the link-path incidence matrix. Let
Sλ = {z ∈ RΓ+ :
∑
γ∈Γk
zγ = λk}
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For every z ∈ Zλ, yz = Az is an equilibrium flow vector
satisfying Byz = ν. Define G(z) as in (14) and extend (12)
and (20) as
x˙i(t) = ν
+
i +
∑
j∈E
Rji(t)yj(t)− yi(t) , (57)
and
Hi(y, z) := Gi(z)
(
ν+i +
∑
j:κj=θi
yj
)
− yi , i ∈ E . (58)
respectively. Then all the results carry over with the notion
Wardrop equilibrium defined as in [19, Sect. 2.1] and the
min-cut feasibility condition (cf. [14])∑
i∈U
νi <
∑
i∈E :
θi∈U, κi /∈U
Ci , ∀U ⊆ V .
Notice that the extension illustrated above allows one
for considering multiple origin-destination pairs. However,
it considers a physical dynamics of the traffic flows with a
single aggregate commodity, while it keeps the commodities
separated as far as the rout decision dynamics are concerned.
An alternative approach could entail a multicommodity model
also of the physical dynamics of the traffic flows. However, such
multicommodity dynamical flow networks lose fundamental
monotonicity properties (cf. [43]) that enable, in particular
the proof of Lemma 2 as presented in this paper. This means
that, in order to generalize the results of this paper with a
multicommodity physical dynamics of the traffic flows, one
should be able to find different ways to guarantee their global
exponential stability.
Finally, as mentioned in Remark 1, the fact that the flow
functions are strictly increasing limits the applicability of the
results in this paper in road traffic network applications to the
so-called free-flow region. One possible approach to extend the
setting outside such free-flow region consists in modeling the
physical dynamics of the traffic flows with monotone non-FIFO
versions of the Cell Transmission Model [17] as proposed and
analysed, e.g., in [44] thus keeping monoticity and contractivity
properties of the physical flow dynamics. The difficulty in this
case comes from the fact that the outflow from and the latency
on a cell would depend on the traffic volumes both on that cell
and on the ones immediately downstream, thus making one
lose separability of the latency functions. Such an approach
may possibly be pursued using techniques developed in the
context of traffic assignment problems with non-separable cost
functions, see, e.g., [45]–[47] and [19, Section 2.5].
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we will present a numerical study comparing
both the asymptotic and the transient performance of multi-
scale transportation networks controlled by dynamic feedback
marginal cost tolls (28) and constant marginal cost tolls (30).
Considering the graph topology as in Fig. 5 and for several
values of the parameter η, in all of our simulations we found
that dynamic feedback marginal cost tolls outperform constant
marginal ones. Indeed:
o
a
b
d
i1
i2
i3
i4
i5
1 1
Figure 5. The graph topology used for the simulations.
• concerning the transient convergence, it appears that the
time needed to reach the perturbed equilibrium associated
to the dynamic feedback marginal cost tolls is lower than
the time to reach the perturbed equilibrium associated to
the constant marginal ones.
• as the uncertainty parameter β of the route choice goes to
infinity the perturbed equilibrium associated to dynamic
feedback marginal cost tolls asymptotically converges to
the social optimum flow faster than the one associated to
the constant marginal cost tolls.
We illustrate these findings in the following simple case:
• network topology G as in Fig. 5;
• flow function as in (9) and corresponding delay function
as in (10), with capacity Ci = 2 for every i ∈ E ;
• F (β) as in (18), η = 0.1, G as in (15) and λ = 1;
• initial conditions: zγ(1)(0) = 1/2, zγ(2)(0) = 1/6,
zγ(3)(0) = 1/3 xi1(0) = 4, xi2(0) = 2, xi3(0) = 3,
xi4(0) = 1, xi5(0) = 5.
Having settled a time horizon T = 350, Fig. 6 displays the 1-
norm distance and the latency loss of y(ω,β)(T ) from the system
optimum y∗ = [1/2; 1/2; 0; 1/2; 1/2]T , for different values of
the uncertainty parameter β. This is done both considering
(28) and the constant marginal tolls (30). Note that while our
theoretical results guarantee that y(ω,β)(T ) converges to y∗ only
in the double limit of large T (asymptotically in time) and large
β (vanishing noise), in our numerical examples convergence
is practically observed already for relatively small values of
β. Our simulations also suggest that convergence of y(ω,β)(T )
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
|| y
-
y*
|| 1
constant marginal tolls
marginal tolls
11 11.5 12
4
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6
10-3
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0
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0.1
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(y*
)
constant marginal tolls
marginal tolls
11 11.5 12
7
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10-4
Figure 6. Plot of ‖y(ω,β)(T ) − y∗‖1 and L(y(ω,β)(T )) − L(y∗) for
decentralised marginal and constant marginal tolls .
to the system optimum is faster for the feedback marginal
cost tolls (28) than for the fixed marginal cost (30). Hence, in
addition to variations of network’s parameters and exogenous
loads, feedback marginal cost tolls appear to be more robust
than their constant counterparts also when it comes to noise.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 7. The trajectory x(t) for different values of the delay φ.
A. Effect of information delays
In this section we study the effects of delays in the global
information of the slow scale dynamics (17) on the system (19).
Considering at first the case of marginal cost tolls, we take a
time-delay φ and li(t− φ) + wi(t− φ) as the cost perceived
by each user crossing a link i ∈ E . Fixing the uncertainty
parameter β and varying φ, we observe how changes the time-
evolution of the volume x and how the correspondent flow
y approximates the social optimum flow y∗(λ) with λ = 1.
For that, we use the graph topology as in Fig. 5 and the same
parameters as before. Then, fixing β = 5, we perform the
trajectory x for different value of φ as show in the Fig. 7. In
Figure 7(a) and 7(b) we can note that the volume x converges
to the equilibrium. By numerical simulations one gets that
φ = 9 is the bigger value for which one has convergence (see
Fig. 7(b)), because for φ > 9 one witness a phase transition of
the system, namely one observes an oscillatory behaviour. We
can also note in Figure 7(c) and 7(d) that the bigger φ is the
greater the oscillation amplitude and phase. A similar situation
can be seen in the plot of the 1-norm distance of y from y∗
in Fig. 8, for the same value of φ used in Figure 7.
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Figure 8. Plot of ‖y(t)− y∗‖1 for different values of the delay φ.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9. Trajectories with constant marginal tolls, for different values of
the delay φ.
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Figure 10. Plot of ‖y(t)− y∗‖1 for different values of φ.
Consider now the case of constant marginal cost tolls (30).
Let φ be the time delay as before and τi(yi(t− φ)) + w∗i the
cost perceived by each user crossing a link i ∈ E . Still using
the graph topology as in Fig. 5 and fixing β = 5 we perform
the trajectory x and the 1-norm distance of the correspond flow
y from y∗ with the different values of φ used before. From
Figure 9 we can note that for all considered values of φ the
trajectory x converges to the equilibrium. This differs from
what happens using the marginal cost tolls (see Figure 7) and
highlights how time-delays affect marginal cost tolls more than
their constant counterpart. The plot of the 1-norm, Fig. 10,
confirms the same trend, indeed after some initial oscillations,
the 1-norm is the same for the different values of φ.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the stability of Wardrop
equilibria in multi-scale dynamical transportation networks with
distributed feedback pricing. In particular, we have proved that,
if the frequency of path preferences updates is sufficiently slow,
monotone decentralized flow-dependent dynamical tollsmake
the network asymptotically approach a neighborhood of the
Wardrop equilibrium. For a particular class of tolls, i.e.,
the marginal cost ones, we have proved that the stability
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is guaranteed to be around the social optimum equilibrium.
Through numerical experiments, both asymptotic and transient
performance of the system have been shown to be better with
feedback marginal cost tolls than with constant marginal ones.
Finally, the impact of information delays has been investigated
through numerical simulations, showing how their influence
the stability and convergence of the network flow dynamics.
In particular, such numerical simulations suggest that feedback
marginal cost tolls might be more fragile to information delays
that constant tolls.
In future research, inspired by the numerical results we
will provide analytic estimates about the different convergence
rates. Moreover, we also plan to analytically investigate the
issue of robustness of feedback tolls to information delays and
to consider anticipatory learning dynamics that incorporate
derivative actions (c.f., [48]).
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The fact that the latency function τi is twice continuously
differentiable on [0, Ci), strictly increasing, and such that
τi(0) > 0 directly follows from Assumption 1. We now
prove that y 7→ yτi(y) is strictly convex computing its second
derivative. For a given y ∈ [0, Ci), let x = ϕ−1i (y), a = ϕ′i(x),
and b = ϕ′i(x). Then,
(yτi(y))
′′
= 2τ ′i(y) + yτ
′′
i (y)
=
2(y − xa)
ay2
+
−y4b/a− 2y3a+ 2y2xa2
y4a2
= − b
a3
.
Now, observe that Assumption 1 guarantees that a > 0 and
b > 0. Hence, (yτi(y))
′′
> 0 and therefore yτi(y) is strictly
convex, thus completing the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
From Assumption 1 and the fact that the toll on a link is
a non-decreasing function of the flow on that link only, it
follows that the perceived cost function τi(yi) + ωi(yi) on
link i is continuous, strictly increasing, and grater than zero
when yi = 0. The claim then follows as a direct application
of Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 in [19].
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